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WATER, WATER, EVERYWHERE?: LEGAL STRUCTURES FOR
THE CONTRACTING AND PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC
WATER RESOURCES
Aldo Davila*
Andrew Whitford**
I. INTRODUCTION

Water is perhaps the most precious natural resource. Wars have
been fought and people have lost their lives to control or to have access to
this precious substance, and future wars may be waged over access.' At
the same time, today's global economy puts pressure on governments
around. the globe to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their
provision of services. One way some governments have responded to this
pressure is by contracting 2 the provision of this basic resource.
The use of contracting is an institutional solution to a peculiar
government problem, as traditionally governments provide services that
the private sector cannot or will not provide. What is the role for
government once water privatization has been instituted? Because in
many countries water is a basic and valuable resource for both life and
economic development, a central role for government is to manage the
distribution of this resource between advantaged and disadvantaged
* Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public & International
Affairs, The University of Georgia.
** Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of
Public & International Affairs, The University of Georgia
' See PETER H. GLEICK, WATERS IN CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER

RESOURCES 108 (Oxford University Press 1993); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon,
EnvironmentalScarcitiesand Violent Conflict, 19 Int'l Security 5 (1994), available at
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/evidence/evidl.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007);
Wilfried Remans, Water and War, 8 Humantiires V6lkerrecht 4 (1995); KEVIN R.
SANSOM ET AL., CONTRACTING OUT WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES: GUIDANCE
NOTES FOR SERVICE AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
(WEDC 2003); ARTHUR H. WESTING, GLOBAL RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN STRATEGIC POLICY AND ACTION 13 (SIPRI

1986).
use contracting and outsourcing interchangeably.

2 We
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classes of citizens. On one hand, how governments distribute scarce
resources has the end result of limiting social conflict, and in some cases,
even deterring revolution - an outcome that in many ways benefits
advantaged classes. On the other hand, disadvantaged classes may need
government's intervention to gain a better quality of life by providing
services that they could not otherwise afford.
This starting point motivates our essay on the contracting of water
provision. A major argument against the privatization of government
water utilities is that market forces will affect the price of water, putting
pressure on disadvantaged populations; a private entity providing water
might engage in "hold up," stopping its operations and leaving local
populations without water for periods of time either intentionally or
inadvertently. Historically, the responsibility for securing water provision
has been delegated to local governments.
The transfer of this
responsibility to a private authority shifts part of the responsibility, but not
necessarily all of it. Local governments may still feel substantial local
pressure to secure water provision, while private entities only take on
liability. This means that governments should fully consider all the
benefits and risks associated with water privatization - including the
contingency of failure by private providers.
The purpose of this essay is to provide a set of principles for
government executives evaluating water privatization efforts based on
examples and recommendations from prior attempts around the world.
This paper has four sections. In the first section we consider differences
between contracting and privatization, which is essential to framing the
debate on the provision of water by a non-public entity. We then elaborate
on analytic approaches to understanding contracting generally, drawn
from transactions cost economics, which uses task complexity,
contestability, and asset-specificity as means for evaluating the contracting
decision. Such approaches are important starting points for considering
the unique situation of water as a target of privatization efforts. The
second section reviews background information about key issues involved
in the privatization of water resources. The third section will discuss
specific events in water privatization attempts in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. In the fourth section, we assess specific recommendations about
water privatization. Finally, in the conclusion we highlight important
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points, some shortcomings of previous analysis, and suggestions for future
research.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTRACTING AND PRIVATIZATION
We start by arguing that contracting and privatization are similar
but distinct. The two terms vary in several important ways, although these
differences are not always clear in use. To some, contracting is
"government agreeing to contracts with private or non-profit groups to
deliver certain services" for a specified period of time, whereas
privatization is the "use of nongovernmental agencies to provide goods
and services previously provided by government" from that point
forward.3 In practice, a core difference is that contractors must renew
their contracts and continue to give the most competitive bid. However, in
many cases privatization is semi-permanent: once a service has been
privatized, that firm no longer has to renew any contract with the
government to continue the provision of that service; permanence being
conditional and depending on the willingness and interests of governments
to renationalize service provision.
Both contracting and privatization are important tools for many
governments facing pressure to become more efficient and effective in
providing a multitude of services. In many countries, firms may lobby
public officials to expand either activity - contracting or privatization especially in the case of water services. Firms know that such contracts
can be stable revenue sources and that in many cases the only "market
competition" occurs at the point when firms lobby politicians on the
distribution of contracts.
When is it acceptable to privatize or contract the provision of
services? Of course, there are many reasons why companies and
governments decide to "buy" (contract or outsource) rather than "make"
(produce within an organization).4 One useful perspective, which draws
3 RICHARD B. DENHARDT & JOSEPH W. GRUBBS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: AN ACTION
ORIENTATION 118-119 (4 1hed. Wadsworth Publishing 2003).
4 MIKE JOHNSON, OUTSOURCING INBRIEF (Butterworth-Heinemann 1997); Philip Keefer,

ContractingOut: An Opportunityfor Public Sector Reform 2-3,, (The World Bank,
Working Paper No. 19908, 1998), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/01/20/00009494
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from transaction cost economics, is that we can assess any privatization
decision by considering the task's complexity, the degree of contestability,
and the specificity of the asset.5 Essentially, outsourcing is justifiable
when the total costs (both production and contract management) are lower
for government. The problem for a government is to assess the
governance costs of contracting ex ante. While outsourcing may reduce
the costs of service delivery, management costs may increase and offset
the savings. This perspective encourages governments to limit governance
costs, in the form of bargaining and opportunism. Bargaining costs
include the original costs of negotiation, any renegotiation costs, the costs
of monitoring the contract, and the costs of conflict. Bargaining costs can
occur even when parties negotiate in good faith, but opportunism is
particularly important when parties mischaracterize the reasons for their
behavior, out of line with the original contract.
Just as with other types of goods and services, contracting water
provision probably works best when there is low task complexity, high
contestability, and low asset specificity. A specific example of low task
complexity is the case where governments contract for billing services. If
there are many billing firms operating in the area from which they can
select, there is high contestability; low asset specificity could be present if
contractors use their assets (i.e., computers) for more than just billing
purposes, or can bill for more than just water services. If one of these
three is not present (e.g. low task complexity, high contestability, or low
asset-specificity) the costs of outsourcing will rise. Of course, the
acquisition and maintenance of both physical plants and the technical
expertise necessary for building and maintaining water plants suffers from
this kind of high asset - specificity. Contractors will account for this kind
of high asset-specificity by raising bid prices or shifting to production
technologies that are less asset-specific, but probably have a higher
provision cost. In general, the rental or leasing of government-owned
6_0101100543291/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf; DAVID OATES & JIM DURCAN,
OUTSOURCING AND THE VIRTUAL ORGANIZATION (Random House Business Books,
1998); KEVIN R. SANSOM ET AL., supra note 2.
5 See Steven Globerman and Aidan R. Vining, A Framework for Evaluating the
Government Contracting-OutDecision with an Application to Information Technology,
56 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 577 (1996); ANNA GRANDORI, ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL

BEHAVIOUR (Routledge 1999).
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assets to the contractor might mitigate the contractor's incentives to use
less efficient means of production. 6
In addition to high asset-specificity if there is low contestability,
both the contractor and the government are held hostage. This is a
situation of bilateral monopoly: the government cannot easily replace the
supplier and the contractor must take on high costs due to high assetspecificity.7 Governments considering outsourcing may seek to use
multiple contractors, but this tactic may have limited use if asset
specificity is high. Adding high task complexity only makes the situation
worse as bargaining costs increase when the two parties disagree about ex
ante specification and/or ex post performance; in this case, the "make or
buy" decision often comes down on the side of internal production.
III. THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF WATER PRIVATIZATION

From 1990 to 2002, the number of people being provided with
water via some sort of privatization agreement expanded from
approximately 51 million people to nearly 300 million; yet, public water
utilities continue to provide approximately 95 percent of the world's
population with water and wastewater services. 8 The numbers of people
worldwide without secure water are staggering: while in urban areas the
proportion in 1999 with secure water was around 94 percent, the
proportion in rural areas were less than 50 percent in Africa and less than
70 percent worldwide. 9 The number is even lower among the poorest
countries, less than 25 percent.1o For this and a number of reasons,
governments and efforts like the World Bank's Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency's Privatization Link and the United Nations Joint
Steven Globerman and Aidan R. Vining, supranote 5.
ANNA GRANDORI, supra note 5.
Meena Palaniappan et al., Water PrivatizationPrinciplesand Practices,in THE
WORLD'S WATER: 2004-2005: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 4578 (Peter H. Gleick ed., Island Press 2004).
6

7

9

WORLD HEALTH ORG. AND UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, GLOBAL WATER
SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000 REPORG, ,availableat

http://www.who.int/docstore/water sanitation health/Globassessment/Global2. 1.htm.
10Kristin Komives et al., Access to Utilities by the Poor:A Global Perspective 13
Discussion Paper No. 2001/15 (UNU/WIDER 2001).
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Monitoring Programme ("JMP") for Water Supply and Sanitation have put
substantial resources into expanding the knowledge of when and where
privatization works for water services.
Governments engage in four major variants of water contracting."
First, governments may form public water corporations or use corporate
utilities in attempts to encourage efficiency and discourage exploitation.
Second, governments may rely on service and leasing contracts; this kind
of mixed management may allow governments to bring in managerial and
operational expertise that may not be available locally.
Third,
governments may follow any of a variety of concession models; BuildOperate-Transfer ("BOT"), Build-Operate-Train-Transfer ("BOTT"),
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer ("BOOT"), Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer
("ROT"), and Build-Operate-Own ("BOO") are the major types used. The
fourth variation is for governments to allow fully private businesses and
small-scale entrepreneurs to produce and sell water. Interestingly, some
argue that the poor often pay much more for water from these private
suppliers or small-scale vendors than they would pay if a regulated
community water system were in place in this arrangement.' 2
Governments rely 4on a variety of partners in these endeavors, although
some very large firms are also involved on a global scale. Major players
include France's Vivendi SA and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (recently
renamed Ondeo), which together own or have an interest in over 120
countries with claims to provide water to around 200 million people, Great
Britain's Thames Water and United Utilities, the American firm Bechtel,
and Spain's Aguas de Barcelona.' 3 As with many other multinational
corporations, these firms have interlocking directorates, own partial shares
in one another, and employ joint ventures.
The main reason governments look into private provision is the
private sector's access to capital; the use of private capital to fund water
programs may allow borrowing governments to use other sources of
public and international capital for other societal needs, expanding the
total pool of funds available for social and economic development. Yet,
" PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE WORLD'S WATER 2002-2003: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON
FRESHWATER RESOURCES 64 (Island Press 2002).
12Id. at 69-71.
1

id
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governments face other sources of pressure to privatize water provision,
each rooted in a different set of beliefs. Some of these pressures are
societal - the belief that privatization will satisfy unmet basic needs,
commercial - the mindset that emphasizes that more business is better,
financial - the belief that the private sector mobilizes capital faster and
more cheaply, ideological - the argument that smaller government is
better, and pragmatic - that posit competent, efficient water-system
operations require private participation.' 4
The discussion of contracting water resources is not a recent
phenomenon, occurring in the United States in the late 18 th century and in
France in the 19 th century.' 5 Recent prominence comes from the lack of
provision noted above in many developing nations and the efforts of the
World Bank and others. But, discussions are tainted by recent high profile
privatization failures. For example, water prices tripled over the next five
years following privatization in 1997 of Manila's public water works. The
withdrawal of one firm in 2002 abandoned a project serving 6.5 million
people.16 As Koos Richelle of the European Commission noted: "You
learn as much from your mistakes as your failures, and we need to study
water-privatization failures as well."
Reasons for opposition are varied;
some concerns are about the distribution, affordability, ecological
stewardship, accountability, and lack of public participation.
Numerous guiding principles have been offered to fill this void.
The World Bank and other international water organizations, like the
Global Water Partnership, advocate the Dublin Principles.
These
principles were agreed upon at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro: the ecological principle
focuses on the environment; the institutional principle is that stakeholders
should have a voice in water management; the gender principle argues that
14 d
15 id.
16 Roel Landingin, Loaves, Fishes andDirty Dishes: Manila's
Privatized Water Can't
Handle the Pressure,CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (2003), availableat
http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=51 (last viewed June 20, 2007).
17 See Eric Johnston and Asako Murakami, Water Forum Closes Amid Clash Over
Privatization,THE JAPAN TIMES, March 24, 2003, available at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030324a7.htm (last viewed June
21, 2007).
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women play a central role; and, the instrument principle claims that water
is a scarce resource and should be allocated by economic principles.' 8
More recently, the World Bank has argued that efforts at privatizing water
resources should emphasize the management of water as a social good, the
use of sound economics in water management, and the maintenance of
strong government regulation and public oversight.19 Both sets emphasize
the role public participation plays in developing water systems that meet
clear standards and principles for equitable, efficient, and reliable
operation and management.
IV. WATER PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS
In this section, we review recent specific examples of privatization
efforts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to assess the power of
privatizing the provision water services, and the effects of task
complexity, contestability, and asset-specificity in future privatization
efforts. We begin with Africa, given its central role in recent debates
among multilateral aid providers, then turn to Asia and finally to Latin
America.
In Africa, the main deterrents of performance of water utilities are
governance issues (e.g., corruption) and weak political and market
institutions.
Using data from twenty-one African water utilitieS20
(seventeen public and four with private sector involvement), engaged in
mostly water supply but also production, distribution, and sewerage,
Estache and Kouassi21 show that water utilities using the demand
18 The

Global Development Research Center, The Dublin Statement on Water and
SustainableDevelopment, (1992), availableat http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-

statement.html (last viewed Oct. 29, 2007).
19Palaniappan, supra note 8.

The areas of jurisdiction were at the municipal, province, region, and country
levels;
the countries included were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, and Zambia. See Antonio Estache & Eugene Kouassi, Sector Organization,
Governance,and the Inefficiency ofAfrican Water Utilities(World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 2890, 2002), available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/1453.pdf.
21 Id
20
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approach for rural and peri-urban22 provision of services, are often
inefficient. Development is often community-driven with a preference for
small-scale operations; they then charge higher tariffs23 than they would if
their facilities were efficient. Smaller operations frequently and directly
interact with users, leading users to be more willing to pay; all together,
only 13 percent of utilities operate as efficiently as the best-practice group
(those relatively efficient water utilities).2 4
Unfortunately, policy
designers and public managers lack information that would allow them to
make inefficient operators more efficient.
Out of one hundred and fifty water utilities in the region, less than
10 percent had private sector participation, yet private ownership was
statistically significantly associated with efficiency. 25 Would broader
private sector involvement reduce average tariff charges? Would those
efficiency savings help improve access for disadvantaged groups? The
answers are not clear. Throughout Africa, private operators are not
necessarily the best performing utilities, though they invested heavily and
produced improvement in sector operations. The primary drivers of
inefficiency in Africa appear to be related to governance issues and weak
institutions (precursors to broad economic growth).
Generally,
privatization is difficult where there is limited support for markets, let
alone markets for goods and services traditionally supplied by
governments.
In contrast, there seems to be little evidence that private providers
are more efficient than public utilities in Asia. Examining fifty water

Peri-urban areas are areas not serviced by the public utilities of the locality, usually
serviced by independent providers (IPs), usually inhabited by marginalized people who
just erect homes surrounding a city with no title, the municipal utilities and
concessionaires are usually not authorized to connect these residents and have few
incentives to do so. See Tova M. Solo, Independent Water Entrepreneursin Latin
America: The OtherPrivateSector in Water Services 16 (2003), available at
http://wblnO018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf/49a0102c9b95cf028525664b006ala
4/9d85ff0f21515b 1585256d9700768314/$FILE/Tova ingles.pdf (last viewed July 23,
2007).
23 Tariffs are the amounts charged to customers.
Id
24
22

25

id
id
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utilities in nineteen countrieS26, Estache and Rossi 27 find that twenty-two
utilities had some form of private sector involvement in management,
billing and collection, leak repair, meter reading, source development,
production, or pumping. What determines these utilities' production
costs? Generally, cost increases are higher where there is greater quality.
This higher quality of water induces the number of metered clients to rise;
cleaner water is costly, but there is more demand for this water. Densely
populated areas are cheaper to serve, probably because of lower capital
costs for pumping stations and pipe maintenance. But, there is no
evidence that private or public water utilities are more efficient. Of
course, these utilities may not be concerned with efficiency, and efficiency
is always difficult to measure. But generally, there is little evidence that
privatization increases efficiency or reduces the cost of service.
As privatization occurs, regulators may switch from price or
revenue-cap regulation to rate-of-return regulation, which may cause firms
to reduce costs.28 Regulators may fear a tradeoff between efficiency and
quality - that increased efficiency means reduced water quality. In
practice, efficiency can come as firms invest in the latest technology to
become competitive; public utilities may want to deter privatization of
their own operations by meeting this new standard established by firms "catching up." The Asian experience suggests that the question of
efficiency may come down to competition rather than ownership.
While privatization has not been used much in Africa and used
only marginally in Asia, Latin America presents a unique opportunity to
assess the direct effects of privatization. Using data for eighteen cities
with some form of privatization and twenty-eight control cities2,29 Clarke,
The nineteen countries in this study are Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China
(including Hong Kong and Taiwan), Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines,
Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Vietnam, and Samoa. See Antonio Estache and Martin A. Rossi, How Different is the
Efficiency ofPublic and Private Water Companies in Asia?, 16 World Bank Econ. Rev.
139-148 (2002).
27
26

28

ld

1d
29 Located in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. See George R.G. Clarke
et al., Has Private
Participationin Water and Sewage Improved Coverage? EmpiricalEvidence from Latin
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et al.3 o found no conclusive evidence that privatization improved service
coverage. Their approach allows them to compare municipalities before
and after they introduced privatization and with similar control cities. In
essence, both those municipalities that introduced privatization and those
that did not introduce it improved water and sewerage access. Moreover,
introducing privatization neither improved nor degraded service for the
poorest households. But, the improvement in access over time could not
be attributed to government or private ownership/operation.
Again, this does not mean that privatization may have benefits.
Just as with "catching up" in Asia, privatization in Latin America could
provide benchmark competition that encourages publicly owned utilities to
improve their own performance.31 However, there is low contestability in
this situation because there are often few bidders for contracts, several
large private firms dominate the sector, and many contracts are
renegotiated. Why are there so few bidders? Firms winning contracts
face regulatory oversight for both economic and for health protection
regulation. However, more important perhaps are that the operation of
such facilities have high asset-specificity, that there are no clear
alternative uses for that technical expertise and capital investment, and
that the operation cycle has a long lifespan. With large amounts of capital
invested, in items like water processing plants and pipes, high performing
water utilities are prone to expropriation by developing governments.
Does regulation change the behavior of firms in the water market?
Government-imposed price caps on water utilities can cause firms to
poorly maintain their assets, if only because these assets can function for a
long time so maintained.3 2 Can firms change the rules of the game to
account for this? In Latin America, approximately two-thirds of contracts
are renegotiated 33 ; this bargaining/opportunism cost may increase the total
America (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3445, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=625323 (last visited August 15,
2007).
30
31

Id.
id.

Such caps often only allow for operation costs. Price caps are instituted to limit the
prices firms charge, allowing for an affordable service to the populace, and induce firms
to lower their costs, thus causing a cascade of lower prices. Id
3 See Id.
32
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cost of privatization efforts. Interestingly, Guasch, et al.3 4 show that
having a regulator deters renegotiation, but that having price caps
increases the likelihood of renegotiation.
What kinds of firms would a government encourage to become
involved in privatization? In Latin America, the preference has been for
large private international firms who are given long-term exclusive license
rights to provide water, but there has also been strong opposition in Latin
America to privatization efforts because of "deep rooted convictions that
reserve water resources to the public domain, and against the notion that
water services should be financially viable and that it could be a profitmaking business."35 Is there a role for local entrepreneurs in such
settings? Based on the experiences of six cities in Argentina, Bolivia,
Columbia, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru, it appears that small
independent providers (IPs) can have a positive private impact on water
provision.36 In these areas, IPs compete for customers and operate with
limited government oversight and no government support. Their impact is
substantial, as Jamal Saghir, World Bank Director of Energy and Water
and chair of the Water and Sanitation Sector Board, notes: "small scale
providers serve about 25 percent of the urban population in Latin America
and East Asia, and 50 percent of the urban population in Africa. . ."37
Essentially, IP market shares are largest in areas underserved or left out by
official utilities. Mobile water providers use trucks and/or carts to sell
their water to customers; fixed network providers pipe their water directly
into the consumers' homes. Mobile operators face high costs, low service
volume, and high risk because competitors can change their service areas
as demand changes; network operators have lower costs and lower prices,
offer convenience, provide a high quality service, and are exposed to more
risk due to the necessary capital investment and the possibility of
expropriation and regulation. The transition from mobile operator to
network operator is eased when local and national governments encourage
competition and assure property rights.
J. Luis GauschGuasch et al., Renegotiationof Concession Contracts in Latin America
(World Bank Pol. Res.icy Research, Working Paper No. 3011, 2003), availableat
http://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/esedps/103.htm (last visited August 2, 2007).
35
See Tova M. Solo, supra note 22, at 5.
3
1 d. at 30.
3 Id. at 4.
34
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What are the long-term prospects for private provision of water by
IPs in developing countries? Generally, even if IPs have enough business
acumen to negotiate the vagaries of their markets, and even if IPs grow to
command a substantial market share, the impact on disadvantaged
populations can still be negative. It is believed that IPs charge four to ten
times the public water utilities' unit price, and while that is below the
rumored 20 to 150 times the inflated price, the impact on wealth is still
substantial.3 8 More importantly, government policies regarding the
extension of service provision or the regulation of private network
operators affects their willingness to improve their infrastructure. If a
private concessionaire of water expands its coverage aggressively, the
long-term prospects for IPs will be limited. IPs also fear the expropriation
of assets. Is that sufficient to deter their investments? In the end, it
probably is not. As Abel Mejia, World Bank Water Sector Manager in the
Latin American and the Caribbean Region, notes: "even the poor are not
willing to pay but are actually paying for water services when the service
is provided to them, even in a less than optimal way." 39

V.

DiSCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

In this section we assess specific recommendations for the
privatization of water provision for the purpose of enhancing efficiency
and price reduction; efficacy guidelines are dependent on the institutional
and competitive context, but these factors are central for those developing
strategies for privatization. Generally, public utilities worldwide charge
customers only the operating costs for service provision and rely on loans
for infrastructure improvements and the expansion of coverage. As most
economists would argue, and as the Dublin Principles indicate, also
factoring in expansion and infrastructure improvement costs by public
utilities for correcting water pricing is significant, either as a precursor for
eventual privatization or the public retention of water provision.
Strategically speaking, price changes are usually phased in to allow
disadvantaged residents time to accommodate increased water costs. Such
behavior serves to build faith in public utilities and reduce the probability
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of privatization.
Complete privatization is always an option, but
drastically adjusting tariffs prior to privatization is one way public
officials create a sense of "urgency, 40 about the current state of increasing
water prices, and due to the inevitability of rising water prices,
privatization is seen as an easy alternative. Given that prices will rise,
privatization is offered as a solution. For the long-term viability of
privatization, the core issue in many developing countries is how to ensure
that disadvantaged populations are not harmed by increasing prices. In
industrialized nations where public water utilities have already extended
coverage and governments are stable, a central question is whether price
caps cause constrained competition. As noted, price caps lower service
quality and can damage proper asset maintenance; price caps also increase
the likelihood of the renegotiation of contracts, increasing
bargaining/opportunism costs, and increasing the total costs of contracting.
However, regulatory agencies are necessary to insure that standards are
met and to reduce the likelihood of renegotiation.
Governments often phase in privatization efforts, usually the
simplest tasks first. One example of simple outsourcing is the billing
department. This low task complexity function allows governments to
build the capacity for the more effective and efficient management of
contracts. Governments often progress to contracting more intricate tasks,
up to the full privatization of water provision. However, just phasing in
complex tasks may not be viewed as positively if the public believes that
privatization reduces costs immediately. For that reason, political viability
may lead to the contracting of tasks with high task complexity, such as
privatizing water provision, even when governments do not have the
capacity and experience to manage the contracts efficiently and
effectively, thus causing governments to stumble and gain competency
along the way.
Moreover, high asset specificity can lead to a hostage situation
when there is low contestability for contracts. If a government sells to a
contractor its water provision assets, what happens if the firm goes
In Kurt Lewin's view, change processes have three phases: unfreezing,
changing, and
refreezing. "Urgency" in the unfreezing stage motivates people to change their
perspective. See JOHN R. JR. SCHERMERHORN ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 364
(9" Ed.(9th ed. 2005).
40
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bankrupt? Leasing of assets gives governments some capacity to provide
services in those events, but leases also induce risk for firms if
governments expropriate their investments. To address this leasing issue,
payment of negotiated prices for assets is an alternative, but can be
problematic because firms may invest more in infrastructure than is
efficient because negotiated prices are forms of security.
Even in industrialized nations, the central problem that designers
of privatization face is low contestability in the provision of water.
Contestability only enters during bidding. Because water provision
involves high task complexity, high asset-specificity, and low
contestability, this reduces efficiency gains; firms are just different
monopolies. Even though the benefits of competition are limited by low
contestability, competitive benchmarking may provide another solution to
this conundrum.
In developing nations, the problem is in gaining coverage
extensions when governments are often unstable.
In contrast to
industrialized nations, IPs are a viable option for quickly supplying
marginalized populations. IPs increase competition (contestability) and
can offer some of the promised gains of privatization. The difficulty lies
in the instability of governments that are unlikely to take credible action
against the expropriation of IP assets. Even at four to ten times the price
of utility provided water, the cost of IP-provided water is roughly equal to
operating costs plus the costs for extending coverage and the infrastructure
improvement costs. IPs help solve the first key transactional problem in
the chain of contestability, task complexity, and asset specificity. IPs
(especially mobile IPs) are fairly contestable, their task complexity
depends on the scale of operations, and asset-specificity depends on the
absolute number of customers served.
In general, privatization may not necessarily be the right answer
for every jurisdiction seeking the effects of competition. For example, if
jurisdiction A privatizes water provision, the surrounding jurisdictions, B,
C, D, and E, may see the effects of competition due to their water utilities
being motivated to meet a new benchmark set by the private provider.
The cascading positive effects of higher efficiency and performance will
be realized by the surrounding jurisdictions through the threat of
competition if the private provider in jurisdiction A is better able to bid on
contracts in B, C, D, or E because of proximity. That threat falls as
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proximity is reduced. Essentially, any given jurisdiction prefers to be
affected by the threat of privatization while not actually experiencing
privatization - especially if one values public accountability. This is
especially true for industrialized nations where the gains from
privatization will not be as dramatic as those in developing nations
because the public water utilities are performing well, but are not
motivated to continue increasing their performance.
VI. DiSCUSSION
The purpose of this essay is to assess how governments evaluate
water privatization efforts based on examples and recommendations from
prior attempts around the world. We started with the related roles of
contracting and privatization because this is how the debate on the
provision of water by a non-public entity has been framed. We then
reviewed a number of analytic approaches for understanding contracting,
generally drawn from transaction cost economics. In essence, the
prospects for successful contracting and privatization depend on task
complexity, contestability, and asset-specificity. This is no different for
the privatization of water provision. We then addressed insights from a
broad variety of cases, mostly in developing nations, about the prospects
for enhanced efficiency and lower costs with the provision of water by
private firms. In general, there is very scant evidence for the power of the
private sector - except in the case of small independent providers. Our
analysis of specific recommendations usually made about water and its
privatization reveals the power of considering contestability, asset
specificity, and task complexity. It also reveals why IPs have found
success in some areas of the world.
Why allow for private provision? If we believe that we should manage
water as a societal good, use sound economics in water management, and
maintain strong government regulation and oversight, understanding the
conditions under which private provision is a powerful supplement to the
public sector gives us a route to extending social benefits to disadvantaged
groups. Technical aspects of regulation remain, but even technical
approaches to regulation of private firms providing public services, such
as price caps, can have unintended consequences, like a lower quality of
service and the improper maintenance of assets. More importantly, some
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types of regulation induce opportunistic behavior by firms, like
renegotiation; in the end, those behaviors increase the total costs of
privatization. Moreover, countries strong enough to regulate are also often
strong enough to expropriate, especially those with weak rule of law.
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